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Between 1997 and 2002, at least 10,000 people have been killed and over 
a  million  displaced  as  a  result  of  seven  violent  conﬂicts  in  Indonesia.1 
These violent clashes have been predominantly characterized as ethnic vio- 
lence with complex and interrelated causes (Davidson and Kammen 2002; 
Davidson 2003; Bertrand 2004). Resource dynamics, regime change, political 
struggles, religion, and outside inﬂuences all seem to have played a role in 
these conﬂicts, although it remains difﬁcult to assess the relative weight of 
 
1      Clashes occurred in Aceh, Jakarta (anti-Chinese riots), West and Central Kalimantan 
(between Dayak and Madurese), Sulawesi (Christians and Muslims in Poso), Maluku (again 
between Christians and Muslims), East Timor, and Irian Jaya. 
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such factors. In Indonesia, violence on such a scale had not been seen since 
the previous regime change when Soeharto came to power in 1965. As, except 
for East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya, no large-scale violence had taken place 
in Indonesia for over 30 years, for many inside and outside Indonesia the 
outbursts of violence came as a total surprise. 
How do we explain the outbreaks of violence in different regions of 
Indonesia at the end of Soeharto’s regime? Why did they happen at this par- 
ticular moment in time, and why at so many places almost simultaneously? 
And why did they occur in certain regions with ethnic and religious diver- 
sity, and not in others? During the past ﬁve years, political scientists, histo- 
rians, anthropologists and geographers have all dealt with these questions 
from their own disciplinary background. So far no one has been able to come 
up with a full and coherent explanation, and new studies are still appearing. 
The complexities of the conﬂicts probably require a more integrated and 
multidisciplinary explanation. But is such a ‘total’ explanation possible, or 
are the various different explanations mutually exclusive? 
This review takes a closer look at three sets of explanations by looking into 
three recently published books: Imagined difference; Hatred and the construc- 
tion of identity, a collection of papers edited by Günther Schlee; Nationalism 
and ethnic conﬂict in Indonesia by Jacques Bertrand; and Violent environments 
edited by Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts. These books offer three 
different approaches to the study of violence in Indonesia: a cultural-sym- 
bolic approach, a socio-political institutional approach, and a resource-based 
political economy approach. In an attempt to test the analytical merits of 
each approach, I will apply them to one of the most puzzling violent con- 
ﬂicts in Indonesia, the violence between Dayak and Madurese in West and 
Central Kalimantan. (Schlee’s book, I should add, does not explicitly refer 
to Kalimantan, but contains two pieces on Indonesia and deals with similar 
conﬂicts in other parts of the world.) 
After a brief discussion of the conﬂict in West and Central Kalimantan 
and of the explanations given for it in existing literature, I will outline the 
theoretical approaches and interpretations of the books under review. Some 
details will also be given on the role of academics in the process of identity 
formation and institutionalization. In this connection a fourth and at ﬁrst 
sight unrelated title, Social science research and conservation management in the 
interior of Borneo, has also been included in the review. This book is a col- 
lection of papers written mainly by Dayak authors, and edited by Cristina 
Eghenter, Bernard Sellato, and Simon Devung. What do it and our other 
three studies tell us about the causes, structure, and persistence of violence 
during the turbulent period from the end of the New Order to the restoration 
of democracy in Indonesia? 
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Ethnic violence in Kalimantan 
 
The ethnic cleansing and mass killings of Madurese migrants in 1999 in 
Sambas, West Kalimantan, and in 2001 in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, 
shocked the world.2 All of a sudden, it seemed, the original Dayak popula- 
tion was revolting against newcomers and reclaiming its ancestral lands. The 
display of severed Madurese heads in Western media, and the stories about 
Dayaks eating the hearts and livers of their enemies, stunned the interna- 
tional community.3 In the early days of the 1999 ‘Sambas Incident’, journalists 
and observers seeking quick explanations for this excessive violence turned 
to simplistic, exotic and orientalist observations about the Dayak, ‘the once 
most feared tribe of headhunters in Southeast Asia’, returning to old prac- 
tices of headhunting and cannibalism.4 Others mentioned the economic crisis 
as the immediate cause of the outburst. 
Later, more nuanced explanations appeared. While some continued to 
talk in terms of raids by former ‘headhunters’ and ‘savages’ (CNN 1999b; 
Jakarta Post 2001; New York Times 1999), others looked to cultural controver- 
sies (ICG 2001) and political errors of the past (Colombijn 2002). Fingers 
were pointed at the forced migration of hundreds of thousands from densely 
populated Java, Bali and Madura to Kalimantan, and the lack of integration 
of the migrants into local society (Ave 2003; Dove 1997; HRW 1997); at the 
political heritage of repression under Soeharto’s New Order (Davidson and 
Kammen 2002), and the political instability after his fall (Davidson 2003; 
Putra 1999); at a failing legal system and the likelihood of malicious political 
manipulation by Indonesian authorities (HRW 1997; ICG 2001; Schiller and 
Garang 2002); and at deeply rooted cultural and religious tensions (Schiller 
and Garang 2002). Van Klinken (2003:70) analysed the conﬂict in the context 
of decentralization, and blamed local ethnic elites ‘who deﬂect democratiza- 
tion by stimulating ethnic conﬂict’. The arguments expressed in these studies 
remain rather fragmentary, and do not provide a comprehensive explanation. 
But taken together and in retrospect, they provide a pretty coherent explana- 
tion of the violence in West and Central Kalimantan, at least from the Dayak 
point of view. By comparison the Madurese perspective, so far, has been 
poorly represented in media reports and in research. 
 
 
 
 
 
2       In the 1996-1997 and 2001 clashes between Dayaks and Madurese in some districts (includ- 
ing Sambas and Sampit) of West and Central Kalimantan, an estimated 3,000 Madurese were 
killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. To date, many of the refugees have not been able 
to return. 
3       See, for instance: Chandrasekaran 2001; CNN 1999a, 1999b; New York Times 1999. 
4       See Linder 1999; CNN 1999b. 
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Three sets of explanations 
 
According to Günther Schlee’s introduction to Imagined differences; Hatred and 
the construction of identity, violence has too often been morally condemned, 
treated almost as a taboo in the social sciences, and studied only indirectly. 
This has prevented social scientists from developing a clear picture and from 
studying ‘naked violence’. ‘If we want to ﬁnd out how, why and under which 
circumstances normal people, who are husbands, fathers, sons and lovers in 
other contexts, commit genocide, massacres and gang rapes, there is little we 
can learn from hearing for the umpteenth time that all these things are very 
bad. If anything, this wrapping in moralism reduces our direct analytical grip 
on the matter.’ (p. 5.) 
Conﬂict starts with the creation of difference, differences between people, 
ethnic groups, and religions, which are constantly created and in need of rec- 
reation. These differences, according to Schlee, are largely imagined. In some 
cases, for instance, units that were to become the ‘ethnic group’ of colonial and 
postcolonial times could not be described as such at all in pre-colonial days, 
when in certain areas there were simply ‘no ethnic groups’ (p. 7). Crucial in 
‘imagining difference’ is the notion of identity and differences in identity, as it is 
shaped and ‘remoulded’ by people who ‘want to make sense of their situation 
[…] simply to ﬁt the needs of their economic or social advancement’ (p. 8). 
Identity is also shaped by political movements that deﬁne different aggre- 
gates of people as the target of their policies, or who instrumentalize identiﬁ- 
cations for the organization of support. ‘There is no end to the kaleidoscopic 
recombinations of features in this game of identity and difference’ (p. 8). 
In this process of imagining difference, history is important: the linguistic, 
cultural and historical similarities with, and differences from, other groups 
are carefully traced. There are no roots of violence, but roots are grown in 
the process of identity construction. ‘They grow their roots; roots grow from 
the present into the past. […] In a similar fashion it is the present societies 
which grow their roots by describing their links to real and faked, often quite 
plausible but selected past events [...].’ (p. 9.) 
To  further  illustrate  the  process  of  identity  construction,  Schlee  uses 
the metaphor of a supermarket. ‘History ﬁlls the shelves with its products: 
culture in all its forms and shapes, and ideology selects from these shelves 
whatever it needs’. The word ‘imagined’ in the title of the book reﬂects the 
arbitrariness of this process; ‘the multiple and mutually contradictory forms 
the deﬁnitions of ethnic groups and nations can take’ (p. 9) differ in each 
situation. Further on in the volume, Philip Quarles van Ufford gives another 
example of this arbitrariness, explaining in ‘Murder in the Cathedral’ the 
imagined violence around the replacement and death of a church leader in 
Java as ‘just an accident’. Here the outbursts of violence are no longer seen 
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as the products of conscious and deliberate moves or schemes. Rather, what 
is suggested is a series of simultaneous collapses of established rules and 
regulations which rendered order illusory and violence uncontrollable (p. 
96). Mark Hobart, who in the same volume analyses the construction and 
imagination of difference and peace ideology through a Balinese play, strug- 
gles with this arbitrariness of imagination. ‘The difﬁculty’, he concludes, ‘is 
deciding in any instance how to determine when, and for whom, ethnicity, 
religion, class, economic or other motives is the “real” cause and when the 
idiom for something else’ (p. 119). 
When it comes to violence, the impunity of this imagination becomes pain- 
fully visible. Or, in the words of Schlee: ‘the products of this imagination [...] 
are often not lofty dreams that fade after some time, but collective identities 
with their own historical dynamics and with expressions in real life, many of 
them violent. They may be dreamt up but they are difﬁcult to dream away 
again’ (p. 9). It is this harsh reality of violence we need to address and con- 
sciously value as a reminder. If we look at the example of the violence in West 
and Central Kalimantan, we cannot neglect the many ‘imagined differences’ 
between the ﬁghting parties. Dayak identities indeed have been shaped and 
sharpened along ethnic, territorial and religious lines as opposed to new- 
comers such as Madurese. They have been constructed historically as well. 
‘Dayak’ is a Dutch construction, designating a collection of ethnic groups 
scattered all over the interior of Borneo. It indicates distinctiveness from the 
Malay people who live predominately in the coastal zones. In a similar way, 
Madurese identity in contemporary Kalimantan has been constructed in con- 
tradistinction, and often antagonism, to local culture and traditions. 
The arbitrariness of this process of the construction of difference lies 
in the fact that ‘real’ divisions between Malay and Dayak, Christians and 
Muslims, indigenous people and newcomers, are difﬁcult to identify. Dayak 
people can be Muslim, many more Javanese than Madurese have moved to 
Kalimantan, and many Madurese have already lived in Kalimantan for over 
three generations. Nevertheless, the proliferation of opposing identities and 
the imagination of differences created a nightmare, which was more than an 
accident. An analysis of the processes of creating differences is useful in order 
to understand why the Madurese were targeted. Highly visible, marginalized 
in a similar way to the Dayak themselves, and religiously and culturally dis- 
tinct, they were an easy target. However interesting and useful the analyses 
of Schlee, Quarles van Ufford and Hobart are in describing the construction 
of difference at the local level, they do not tell us why the violence happened, 
and why at this particular time. 
Jacques Bertrand argues in his book Nationalism and ethnic conﬂict in 
Indonesia that ethnic violence in Indonesia in the late 1990s can largely be 
explained by analysing Indonesia’s national model and its institutionaliza- 
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tion during the New Order of President Soeharto. The late 1990s constituted 
a ‘critical juncture’ in Indonesia’s history, a juncture at which institutional 
transformation opened up possibilities for renegotiating elements of the 
national model: the role of Islam in political institutions, the relative impor- 
tance of central and regional governments, the access and representation of 
ethnic groups in state institutions, and indeed the deﬁnition and meaning 
of the Indonesian nation itself. According to Bertrand, the causes of ethnic 
violence can be traced to the institutional context that deﬁnes and shapes eth- 
nic identities, the ofﬁcial recognition of groups, their representation in state 
institutions, and their institutionalized access to resources. ‘Ethnic identities 
become politicized and the potential for mobilization is heightened when 
groups feel threatened by the structure and principles embedded in political 
institutions. Most obviously, when groups are excluded from representa- 
tion or the ability to pursue their interests within given institutions, they 
may become increasingly alienated from the state.’ (p. 4.) The violence thus 
marked a period of renegotiation of national models and state institutions. 
For this period of reshufﬂing existing power relations and state institu- 
tions, Bertrand uses the term ‘critical juncture’. Indonesia’s critical junctures 
were the periods in which Indonesia swayed between authoritarianism and 
democratization. In fact, nation-state development is cyclical. Periods of 
stable political institutions and ethnic relations are followed by periods of 
institutional reform accompanied by more ethnic violence. At the end of the 
juncture, a national model is reconﬁrmed or a new one adopted, and a differ- 
ent structure of political institutions reﬂects newly achieved gains and losses 
for ethnic groups in terms of inclusion and exclusion. The eruption of ethnic 
violence is an outgrowth of path-dependent choices regarding the national 
model and the institutions deﬁning ethnic relations. 
This interesting and comprehensive book offers an institutionalist analy- 
sis which explains two aspects of the eruption of violence: ﬁrst, it shows 
how institutions have shaped ethnic identities in Indonesia’s history, and 
second, it shows how the development of these identities is constrained by 
concepts of nation and by the national models that are implicit or explicit in 
the institutions. According to Bertrand, ethnic conﬂict is shaped and medi- 
ated by the institutional context in which it occurs. He addresses three inter- 
related institutional contexts which caused or triggered the violence: those 
of national or Jakarta-based elites, those of local elites, and those of groups 
nurturing local grievances against state policies. Access to resources, social 
exclusion, and religious sentiments all played a role. Among the factors that 
recur in all cases of violence in Indonesia are the use of terror by the state’s 
armed forces, and the strong ideas of elites regarding the need for national 
unity. Secessionist movements are seen as the worst threat to the unity of the 
nation and the unity of the state. 
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Bertrand’s study of the conﬂict in West and Central Kalimantan explains 
how this national model excluded some groups from an otherwise largely 
inclusive concept of the Indonesian nation. According to him, the conﬂict 
resulted from the marginalization of the Dayak within the Indonesian nation 
because of their status as a ‘backward’ group. ‘Violent conﬂict is most likely 
to occur when groups feel threatened and have few peaceful instruments 
available to guarantee their survival’ (p. 19). This would also apply to the 
Madurese position in Kalimantan. Violence can also occur when groups are 
included and their recognition acknowledged, but in terms that maintain 
them perpetually in the status of ‘backward’ group or ‘second-class citizens’. 
Again this applies both to the Dayak and the Madurese position. 
Bertrand’s book is convincing and readable because it highlights many 
different causes and mechanisms of ethnic violence in Indonesia. Ultimately, 
he withdraws his initial argument that all can be explained by institutional 
change. The problem remains that his model fails to explain why violence did 
not occur in all areas in Indonesia where marginalized and neglected popula- 
tions live, or why some national institutional changes form critical junctures 
triggering violence while others do not. Moreover, he fails to explain why 
other forms of violence continued to occur during the New Order, outside 
his ‘critical junctures’ (Hüsken and De Jonge 2002). 
A third useful interpretation of the Kalimantan violence can be found in 
an excellent chapter by Peluso and Harwell in the book Violent environments, 
edited by Peluso and Watts. This chapter offers the reader a lengthy and com- 
plete picture of the context in which the conﬂicts in West Kalimantan should 
be placed. First the authors evaluate the role of the national government 
in the erasure of ethnic boundaries and the struggle for control over and 
exploitation of territory. New Order discourses of development, citizenship 
and identity were directly linked to control of, and changes in, access to both 
natural and state resources. According to Peluso and Harwell, the failure of 
these new forms of national territorialization explain the underlying condi- 
tions for violence, while the cultural politics of identity construction explain 
the speciﬁc direction of violence against Madurese. 
If we take this political economy approach to explaining the conﬂict, 
one puzzle remains: Dayak culture and livelihoods seem more threatened 
by local Malays, by large companies, and by the inﬂux of Javanese than 
by Madurese immigration. At the end of the chapter, the analysis therefore 
moves from territory and resource-related explanations to the speciﬁc nature 
of the acts of violence itself as well as their narration. Peluso and Harwell 
show that ways of ‘narration within stories about collective identities polar- 
ized these divisions and helped bind exclusive [ethnic] communities more 
tightly through the perceived threat of imagined violent “others”. In clash- 
ing, these images and identities helped ignite and maintain the […] violence 
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at such a high level. […] Violent identities – both Dayak and Madurese – have 
been produced and reproduced over time, constituted and strengthened by 
participation in violence’ (p. 109). And ultimately, ‘although most Dayaks 
likely did not view the Madurese as a primary driving force in the chang- 
ing political ecological landscape of West Kalimantan, they were viewed as 
being among the beneﬁciaries of these changes’ (p. 114). Javanese, Chinese, 
and some Malays also beneﬁted from the changes that took place during 
the New Order. ‘Yet these latter groups were not seen as perpetrators of the 
disrespectful and dishonourable treatment of Dayak culture and identity 
associated with the Indonesian government (as an abstract entity) and the 
Madurese (as a local community). […] Ultimately tough, the most important 
explanation for “why the Madurese?” and not Chinese, Javanese, or Malays, 
is that Madurese were the only ones who committed purposeful violent acts 
against Dayaks’ (pp. 114-5). 
Finally, the weakening of the New Order ’s legitimacy enabled people to 
speak out about their frustrations and reconstruct a part of their commu- 
nity through violence. The loss of local authority and the failure of national 
authority ‘were thus reshaped by local actors into a form unintended by the 
national policies that led to them: the collective self-authorization of one com- 
munity to inﬂict violence against another ’ (p. 115). Peluso and Harwell have 
shown convincingly that there is more at stake here than cultural differences, 
ethnicity or religion. They probably would agree with Gilley (2004:1156), who 
recently suggested doing away with the concept of ethnic violence altogeth- 
er: ‘We better not speak too hastily of ethnic or religious conﬂicts and might 
choose to abandon the concept of ethnic violence altogether ’, since such 
qualiﬁcations might blur our view of the underlying, long lasting, complex 
tensions over resources, territory, power, and the state in Indonesia. 
 
 
Explaining violence in Indonesia 
 
The foregoing discussion once more makes clear that we cannot relate ethnic 
violence to single causes and processes. Neither can we understand conﬂicts 
by studying outside, national, and political dimensions, or solely by looking 
at the local dimensions of the conﬂict. An analysis of the institutional and 
political-economic dimensions such as provided by Bertrand and by Peluso 
and Watts, as well as inquiries into the local culture and conditions of the par- 
ties in the conﬂict, is absolutely essential in order to understand the practices 
of creating difference as described by Schlee. The players here are not limited 
to local people, strongmen, and policy makers, but can also include jour- 
nalists and social scientists. The book Social science research and conservation 
management in the interior of Borneo, edited by Eghenter, Sellato, and Devung, 
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forms an interesting example of how social science itself can play a role in 
processes of making difference and constructing identity. 
In this book Dayak livelihoods, property rights, oral history, and local 
ways of resource management are described and formalized in an attempt to 
protect Dayak culture and interests. The book is the result of a long period 
of cooperation between local, Dayak, and international conservationists and 
social scientists concerned with the study and protection of both natural 
environments and Dayak culture. The preface is illustrative. ‘Translation of 
the rich cultural heritage of forest-dwelling communities into forms acces- 
sible to outsiders’, it proclaims, ‘would be a scientiﬁc, spiritual and aesthetic 
gift to the rest of the world. That gift would in turn give voice to the com- 
munities themselves, and broaden the constituency for protecting those com- 
munities from thoughtless disruption of the social and ecological systems 
that had generated such cultural riches’ (p. xii). The book belongs to, and 
clearly illustrates, the revival of Dayak identity as described by Peluso and 
Harwell. It is in itself a sign of, and a tool in, the awakening of Dayak ethnic 
identity. There is a need for a similar book on Madurese culture, knowledge 
and livelihoods in Kalimantan. So far, Madurese voices, dreams, and points 
of view have hardly been heard. 
Those who seek to understand the causes of violence in Indonesia or else- 
where may fail to ﬁnd a new theory of violence, social identity and hostility 
in the volume edited by Schlee, as the explanatory value of cultural-sym- 
bolic approaches is not very strong. They will, however, ﬁnd powerful and 
thought-provoking descriptions of the construction of difference and hatred 
which may offer insights into the structure, perpetuation, and constitution 
of violence in different parts of the world. ‘What more can one expect’, asks 
Schlee, ‘in a ﬁeld of knowledge where all attempts at a uniﬁed and all-embrac- 
ing theory so far have been accused of one-sidedness and simpliﬁcation and 
ultimately abandoned?’ (p. 28). The volume convincingly shows that this one- 
sidedness can never be fully avoided. The volume edited by Eghenter, Sellato, 
and Devung is an illustration of this, and demonstrates the role which science 
itself can play in the construction of identities and difference. 
What is needed now is a book which takes all three approaches into 
account. Maybe it is impossible to write such a book, given the virtual 
incompatibility of the cultural-symbolic approach with institutional and 
material views. And perhaps we may never fully grasp the impact and force 
of naked violence unless we have experienced it ourselves. Most interesting 
is the emotional aspect of violence as brought in by Schlee. His book reminds 
us that conﬂicts cannot fully be explained by their causes; one also needs to 
take into account their courses. Violence produces emotions and may mimic 
earlier violence caused by emotions: ‘The conﬂict itself is the ground on 
which hatred is cultivated’ (p. 28). Bertrand, and Peluso and Harwell too, 
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tell us how under conditions of marginalization, institutional change, and 
declining state legitimation, hatreds which are initially directed toward the 
state, or toward a range of foreign ethnic groups, can be redirected or concen- 
trated against one particular ethnicity. From the Madurese point of view in 
Kalimantan, this concentration is probably best understood as a piece of very 
bad luck: the collateral damage of a regime change combined with a ﬁerce 
battle to gain access to resources. 
 
 
References 
 
Avé, Jan 
2003           ‘West Kalimantan; Een analyse van etnische conﬂicten’, in: Coen Holtzap- 
pel (ed.), Eenheid in verscheidenheid: droom of werkelijkheid? Een inleiding tot 
de culturele en etnische verscheidenheid van Indonesië; pp. 299-315. Amster- 
dam: Rozenberg. 
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv 
2001           ‘Attacks terrorize migrants on Borneo’, Washington Post Foreign Service, 24 
February. 
CNN 
1999a ‘Violence  sweeps  northern  Indonesia:  dozens  killed’,  www.cnn.com/ 
world/asiapcf/9903/19/indonesia.01 [19 March]. 
1999b ‘Borneo riots marked by grisly ritual killings: severed heads displayed 
on streets’, www.cnn.com/world/asiapcf/9903/21/indonesia.borneo [21 
March]. 
Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad 
2002 Roots of violence in Indonesia; Contemporary violence in historical perspective. 
Leiden: KITLV Press. [Verhandelingen 194]. 
Davidson, Jamie S. 
2003 ‘The  politics  of  violence  on  an  Indonesian  periphery’,  South  East  Asia 
Research 11:59-89. 
Davidson, Jamie S. and Douglas Kammen 
2002 ‘Indonesia’s unknown war and the lineages of violence in West Kaliman- 
tan’, Indonesia 73:53-87. 
Dove, Michael 
1997 ‘Dayak anger ignored’, Inside Indonesia 51:13-4. 
Gilley, Bruce 
2004 ‘Against the concept of ethnic conﬂict’, Third World Quarterly 25:1155-66. 
HRW 
1997 Indonesia: communal violence in West Kalimantan. New York: Human Rights 
Watch. [HRW Report 10/C.] 
Hüsken, Frans and Huub de Jonge (eds) 
2002 Violence and vengeance; Discontent and conﬂict in New Order Indonesia. Saar- 
brücken: Verlag für Entwicklungspolitik. [Nijmegen Studies in Develop- 
ment and Culture Change 37.] 
Book reviews 575 
 
 
 
ICG 
2001 ‘Communal violence in Indonesia: lessons from Kalimantan’, Asia Report 
19(27 June):1-33. [International Crisis Group.] 
Jakarta Post 
2001 ‘Online special; human tragedy in Sampit’, The Jakarta Post, 14 November. 
Jonge, Huub de 
1995 ‘Stereotypes of the Madurese’, in: Kees van Dijk, Huub de Jonge and Elly 
Touwen-Bouwsma (eds), Across Madura Strait; The dynamics of an insular 
society, pp. 7-25. Leiden: KITLV Press. [Proceedings 2.] 
Klinken, Gerry van 
2002 ‘Indonesia’s  new  ethnic  elites’,  in:  Henk  Schulte  Nordholt  and  Irwan 
Abdullah (eds), Indonesia; In search of transition, pp. 67-105. Yogyakarta: 
Pustaka Pelajar. 
Linder, Dianne 
1999 ‘Ethnic conﬂict in Kalimantan’. ICE [Inventory of Conﬂict and Environ- 
ment] Case Study 11, gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/ice/kaliman.htm [15 
September 2003]. 
New York Times 
1999 ‘Indonesian gangs slaughter foes’, 21 March. 
Peluso, Nancy Lee and Emily Harwell 
2001 ‘Territory, custom, and the cultural politics of ethnic war in West Kali- 
mantan, Indonesia’, in: Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts (eds), Violent 
environments, pp. 83-116. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. 
Putra, R. Masri Sareb 
1999 ‘The solution to the Sambas riots’, The Jakarta Post, 20 April. 
Schiller, Anne, and Bambang Garang 
2002 ‘Religion and inter-ethnic violence in Indonesia’, Journal of Contemporary 
Asia 32:244-54. 
